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Abstract
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of discrete
choice for labor supply, fertility and transition from tenant to home-
owner, to investigate the secular decline in homeownership over the
past several decades, wholly attributable to households postponing the
purchase of their first home. House prices only partly explain the de-
cline; higher base level wages led to lower fertility also contributing to
the decline, because households with children are more likely to own a
home than those without. Somewhat surprisingly we find higher lev-
els of female education ameliorated this trend, highly educated women
placing greater value on home ownership.
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1 Introduction
The average age of a first-time home buyer increased from 28 years old in
the 1970’s, to 30 in the 1990’s, and now stands at 32.1 Delaying the transi-
tion to homeownership resulted in the stagnation and subsequent reduction of
homeownership rates for all cohorts of population in working age (Goodman,
Pendall, and Zhu 2015). Since homeowners rarely revert to renting perma-
nent accommodation and the rate of reverting to renting is fairly stable over
the period, the decline in home ownership is almost entirely attributable to
postponing the first home purchase. Figure 1 illustrates that the delay in first
homeownership coincided with postponing marriage and fertility; the average
age of mother at first birth rising from 22 forty years ago to 24 two decades
ago, and currently stands at about 26. Labor-force participation of females in
their fecund period rose dramatically from 48 percent in 1970’s, to 74 percent
in 1990’s and continues increasing.
There are many studies showing that household decisions about fertility,
labor supply and housing are jointly determined. Homeownership is associ-
ated with lower job-to-job mobility, lower unemployment risk and higher wage
rates (Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer 2008). Increased women’s labor force par-
ticipation is tightly linked to the delay in giving birth to children, due to the
competing allocation of time between work and raising children (Hotz and
Miller 1988). Childbearing is strongly associated with the transition to home-
ownership (O¨st 2012). According to Fannie Mae’s National Housing Survey,
homeownership as the best environment for raising children, is a very impor-
tant reason to buy one. Therefore delays in fertility stemming from greater
female labor force participation might cause women and their partners to post-
pone homeownership. Since marriage and homeownership are correlated, the
decline in marriage might also explain the reduction in homeownership (Fisher
and Gervais 2011). Unanticipated increases in house prices reduce the utility
of first time home buyers at the point of purchase, but increase the utility of
1. US Bureau of the Census, American Housing Survey, Chicago Title and Trust Co.
survey, and authors own calculations based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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Figure 1: Labor force participation rate by age for 1970 - 2000. “Star” denotes
median age at first marriage, “circle” denotes average age at first birth, “triangle”
denotes average age at first homeownership. Age at first marriage is taken from the
US Census Bureau, age at first birth is taken from the National Vital Statistical
Reports (Mathews and Hamilton 2002), age at first homeownership is computed
from the PSID, whereas labor force participation rates are taken from publications
of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Toossi 2002; 2012).
those with housing equity, differentially affecting fertility rates (Dettling and
Kearney 2014).
Whereas the inseparable nature of labor supply, fertility, and homeowner-
ship choices is widely acknowledged, to the best of our knowledge, a unifying
framework integrating these joint decisions has yet to be analyzed. Our analy-
sis seeks to fill this gap by developing and estimating a dynamic discrete choice
model of female labor supply and the timing of births as well as the transition
from tenant to homeowner with the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
in order to explain the secular decline in homeownership within the US. Al-
though the PSID is not a fully representative of the US economy, the trends
in our sample, described in the next section, reflect national aggregates.
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To provide a satisfactory explanation we must overcome challenges in esti-
mation and prediction arising from the inherent nonstationarity of the secular
trends mentioned above, that are further complicated by the path of interest
rates, which first rose and then fell over this period. Inferring the tastes of in-
dividuals from their behavior in nonstationary environments is complicated by
the fact that some of their important decisions made at the times they are sam-
pled reflect aspects of their life that were relevant after the panel ends, which
are the outcomes not observed in the data. To capture these considerations in
an internally consistent way, we leverage the close relationship between cur-
rent (estimated) conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) and future expected
utilities impounded within differences between the continuation values (the
conditional valuation functions) for alternative choices. In this way the model
impounds their expectations about the future within the current equilibrium
choices that have long-term ramifications in a nonergodic world evolving over
time.
Section 3 explains our model and empirical strategy. The parameters of the
model capture household fixed costs of transition to homeownership, prefer-
ences over homeownership, working (and leisure) choices, the number and tim-
ing of children. Technical details on the estimation are relegated to an online
Appendix. The results of the structural estimation are reported in Section 4.
The estimated preference parameters are mostly statistically significant with
intuitively appealing signs and magnitudes. Moreover the one-period ahead
forecasts obtained from solving our model with the estimated parameters track
both individual life-cycle decisions and aggregate secular changes over this pe-
riod quite well. All else being equal, households prefer becoming homeowner
earlier in life. Therefore the delay in homeownership is not a preference, but
rather a result of a trade-off between homeownership and other important
life-cycle decisions. The estimated preference parameters suggest that the
transition to homeownership is positively related to labor market participa-
tion and the presence of children in a household. This finding implies that
whereas an increase in labor market participation can speed up the transition
to homeownership, having fewer children later in life reduces homeownership.
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Given a path for wages, interest rates, house prices and educational attain-
ment, the estimated model can be used to disentangle the effects of fertility
decisions and labor supply on housing choices, and to quantify the dynamic
feedback that homeownership induces on households’ fertility choices and la-
bor supply. A second challenge in analyzing nonstationary environments is
how to make inferences about counterfactuals when the nonstationary pro-
cess is unknown, almost always the case for a short panel. Even in a model
where individuals have perfect foresight, it is impossible to make predictions
about future realizations of such processes without drawing upon information
not in the data set. Here we follow a common practice in macroeconomics of
comparing the long run steady states of different regimes. Our counterfactu-
als compare wages, educational backgrounds, house prices and interest rates
roughly corresponding to the beginning and end of the two-decade sample
frame.2
Section 5 reports the results from simulating the counterfactual regimes.
Summarizing, higher female wages lead to postponing the first home pur-
chase. The effects are indirect, because workforce participation by itself raises
the value of homeownership: however higher base wages also increase the
opportunity cost of leisure and child care and reduce fertility, which are com-
plementary activities to homeownership. These negative effects swamp the
amenity value of owning a home when working. A second contributing factor
to the secular decline in homeownership is higher house prices, which prompt
households to postpone purchasing their own home, and also choosing smaller
homes if they buy. We find that increasing educational attainment leads to
earlier homeownership, and the direct effects of greater benefits from home-
ownership to more educated females are reinforced by their greater labor-force
participation. Thus later cohorts, more educated than their predecessors, re-
tarded the trend away from homeownership. Lastly, we find that lower interest
rates induce households to postpone homeownership, a feature that is evident
in the data, both in our sample period and also in the years that followed; it
2. In our framework it is also straightforward to predict the evolution of one steady state
to another, and these results are available from the authors on request.
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is also a characteristic of the solution to our estimated dynamic optimization
model. Intuitively households save throughout their lifecycle, and the wealth
effect from an earlier purchase dominates the intertemporal lifecycle substitu-
tion effect of reducing consumption when young. However since interest rates
rose and then fell over this period we hesitate to emphasize the role of interest
rates in explaining the decline in homeownership over this period. Section 6
concludes. Overall, rising house prices and higher female wages explained the
trend in postponing homeownership over that 20 year period, a trend that was
ameliorated by greater female educational attainment.
2 Lifecycle Patterns and Secular Changes
Our empirical analysis draws upon the PSID for the years 1968 through 1993.
This data set and the time frame has three key advantages for the purpose of
this study. First, it contains broad and comprehensive information on house-
hold housing, labor supply, income, and detailed family characteristics for a
moderately representative sample of households of the US population.3 Sec-
ond, the PSID data set has a panel dimension so that we can measure house-
hold transition to homeownership, intertemporal labor-supply dynamics and
changes in family composition due to births of children. Third this time frame
captures the secular changes at the heart of this study well, with declining fer-
tility, increased female education, rising female workforce participation, and
decreasing homeownership.4
Our model controls for whether the household is headed by a couple or a
single woman, along with the characteristics of partners. The study is con-
ducted from the perspective of females: they bear the children; mothers spend
more time with their children than fathers; throughout the period under con-
sideration mothers were almost invariably awarded child custody in the event
3. We exclude the poverty subsample and the Latino subsample added to the PSID closer
to the end of our study period.
4. In addition we avoid the disruptions in the years leading up to the housing boom and
subsequent bust in 2006, as well as the complications associated with the PSID changing its
format from an annual to a biennial survey in 1997.
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of divorce; on average females spent more time at home than males because
their workforce participation rate was lower; female labor supply exhibited
more variation in the lifecycle over the time frame in which households are
most likely to purchase their first home. Most first homeownership choices are
made before the age of 45, her labor-force participation settles in this phase
of life, and almost all births occur then too. For these reasons, our study
considers single and married females in their fecund stage of life between the
ages of 22 and 45.
Demographic characteristics include age, education and marital status of
the individual, family size of household, number of children and their ages.
Labor-force participation data include number of hours put into working ac-
tivities and earnings. We also used information on household housing arrange-
ments, including number of rooms in a dwelling, indicator for homeownership,
value of primary residence for homeowners and amount of rent paid by tenants.
All monetary values, such as house value for homeowners, rent paid by tenants
and labor income, are adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price Index and
converted into 1984 dollars.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data sample used in the anal-
ysis. Over the observed time period, the average homeownership rate for the
sample of 22-45 years old females constitutes 64 percent, thus matching the
homeownership rate reported by other nationally representative data over the
same time period (e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing Vacancy Rate
Survey, Smith, Rosen, and Fallis 1988). The demographic profile of homeown-
ers differs from tenants along several dimensions, some of which are directly
related to their age, where they are in the lifecycle. Compared to tenants,
homeowners are older, slightly more educated, more likely to be married, have
more children, have more living space, are less likely to work, and conditional
on workforce participation, work fewer hours.
Some of these differences can be attributed to the fact that homeowners
have progressed further through their lifecycle than tenants. Because they
are older, homeowners are more likely to be married and have more children,
and if their children are young likely to work less hours, but conditional on
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Full sample Owners Renters
Age 32.4 33.9 29.7
Education 13.0 13.0 12.9
Married 0.82 0.92 0.64
Number of children 1.53 1.67 1.28
Home ownership rate 0.64
House value for home owners 66,381
Annual rent for renters 2,956
Move to owned house 0.087
own-to-own∗∗ 0.062
rent-to-own∗∗∗ 0.064
Move to rental house 0.126
rent-to-rent∗∗∗ 0.329
own-to-rent∗∗∗ 0.041
Number of rooms in dwelling 5.8 6.4 4.7
Labor force participation 0.753 0.736 0.783
Hours worked∗ 1,497 1,479 1,527
Labor income∗ 11,070 11,504 10,341
Number of observations 43,504 27,871 15,633
Sample averages for females between 22 and 45 years old; data covers
1968 through 1993.
∗Conditional on working.
∗∗Including observations on households who spend one or two years of
renting between two consecutive home ownerships.
∗∗∗Excluding observations on households who spend one or two years
of renting between two consecutive home ownerships.
working they are also likely to have more experience and hence earn a higher
wage. These kinds of differences require a dynamic approach to satisfactorily
resolve.
The table also shows tenants move much more frequently than homeowners.
Almost one third of tenants move each year, and about 6 percent of home-
owners were tenants in the previous year. Presumably the costs of moving
increase with the size of the household, for example from school aged children
switching schools, to spouses coordinating employment. Since rental contracts
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Figure 2: Average homeownership rate.
are generally designed for a much shorter term duration than home purchase,
it is reasonable to speculate that as households grow, their preferences shift
towards homeownership, and hence delays in forming multiperson households
might be associated with postponing home purchase.
There is, however, scant evidence that the reverse movement, from owner-
ship to renting, changed over the period under consideration. Our estimates
from the PSID, illustrated in Figure 7 of the Supplementary Appendix, show
that over the period 1970 through 1995 the transition from ownership to rental
was roughly constant at the roughly 4 percent reported in Table 1, experiencing
a statistically insignificant and quantitatively small decline. Thus the decline
in homeownership over this period was almost entirely driven by fewer tran-
sitions from renting to ownership rather than greater transitions in the other
direction.
Figure 2 illustrates homeownership profile over the life cycle, broken down
by marital status and children. Broadly speaking, larger and older households
are more likely to be homeowners. For both married and single households,
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homeownership is greater for households with children. On average, the home-
ownership rate of families with children is 5 to 7 percent higher compared to
families with the same marital status but without children. Similarly house-
holds with two heads are more likely to be homeowners than single headed
households.
Figure 3 illustrates the delay in fertility is associated with the delay in
homeownership. As the average age at having first child steadily increased,
the average age at the birth of second child also increased with the timing
between consecutive birth at about 2 years in 1970s and 1980s, and a reduction
of the average time between the first and second child to 1.5 years by 1990s.
Figure 3 shows the timing of purchase of the first home has a delayed pattern
over the life cycle similar to the delay in fertility. Figure 3 shows the age
at first homeownership closely follows the birth of the second child. In early
1970s first homeownership occurs on average one year after the birth of the
second child, while in late 1970s and up to early 1990s the timing of the first
homeownership and the birth of the second child nearly coincide. Indeed, two
thirds of households have one or more children at the time of purchase of their
first home; half of first time home buyers have only 1 or 2 children, and one
third have only one child at the time of home purchase. Most firstborns were
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at least one year old at the time of the home purchase, observations consistent
with the findings of O¨st (2012).
Finally, postponing homeownership is associated with ultimately purchas-
ing a larger residence. Figure 4 illustrates the delay is aligned with the growing
size of first home as a number of rooms per family member (the right-hand
scale). The US Census Bureau reports that over time the average size of a
single-family house increased from 1600 square feet in 1970 to 2400 square feet
in 2010. Furthermore increased residential housing size is observed not only
for homeowners, but also for tenants. In an economy where household size
grows though time, and large households prefer more dwelling space, house-
holds tend to be tenants when they are young and homeowners when they are
older. Moreover exogenous delaying home purchase would plausibly induce
both average rental tenements and increased homeowner dwellings to increase
in size. Part of the puzzle, then, is to explain how these behavioral shifts were
resolved by the underlying driving factors over this period.
3 The Model
The evidence presented above strongly suggests that households jointly de-
termine their fertility, labor supply and housing decisions over the life cycle.
The first parts of this section develop a dynamic model of discrete choice of
housing demand, fertility choice and labor supply to explain households’ deci-
sion making process. Then we propose an estimator for the preferences of the
model.
Only a tiny fraction of mothers put their babies out for adoption, and
very few homeowners become tenants, rarely selling their first homes within
a few years of purchase.5 Empirically it is not possible to separately estimate
(nonparametrically) the current utility a household receives from a child on an
annual basis. Therefore we assume giving birth and becoming homeowner are
5. Thus we treat becoming a homeowner (or equivalently marrying/having a spouse who
is/becomes one) as a stopping problem. With a larger data set on homeownership that
covers the housing crisis after the financial crash of 2008, our model can be adapted to
analyze foreclosure as an unanticpated event in a nonstationary economy.
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irreversible choices, and model the expected lifetime benefits from offspring at
their point of birth. Of course all the benefits from having children do not
literally occur at the time of birth, but there is an observational equivalence
when only data on births, not current benefits of children, are available. For
similar reasons, we model the expected lifetime benefits of first homeownership
as accruing at the point of sale. When becoming a homeowner, the household
balances the transaction cost of purchase and a size inertia inherent to home-
ownership against the benefits of tailoring their own property to individual
tastes and having more geographic stability to cultivate social and economic
opportunities within the neighborhood.
Current female labor supply is treated as a period-by-period decision; her
choices affect her future wages through learning by doing, inducing persistence
in labor supply over time. Hours worked are modeled as a stochastic process
conditional on participation and the state variables in the model, including
past participation and past hours. Finally, since the timing of first birth and
marriage are correlated (Figure 1), and since it essentially involves an implicit
(sometimes explicit) contract about dividing assets upon separation, we treat
the event of marriage as a stochastic process driven by the state variables (such
as the age and number of children) rather than an explicit choice variable, and
interpret declining marriage rates throughout this period as reflecting a decline
in activities the marriage contract facilitates, not a causal factor itself.
3.1 Choices
Each period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} the household makes a continuous current con-
sumption choice denoted by ct, a discrete labor-force participation choice
wt ∈ {0, 1}, where working is denoted by wt = 1, and a fertility choice
bt ∈ {0, 1}, where a birth is indicated by bt = 1. If she is a tenant at t,
she also decides whether to continue renting by setting ht = 0 or changing her
accommodation status and purchasing a home, by setting ht = 1. We assume
giving birth is only possible up to age T1, and at age T2, where T2 ≥ T1 the
household retires, and, if still a tenant at that age, remains one forever. These
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assumptions are innocuous because our empirical work focuses on women less
than 45 years old. To represent the choice set parsimoniously, let djt ∈ {0, 1}
where djt = 1 for:
j ≡ (1− ht) bt (1− wt) + 2 (1− ht) (1− bt)wt + 3 (1− ht) btwt
+4ht (1− bt) (1− wt) + 5htbt (1− wt) + 6ht (1− bt)wt + 7htbtwt.
Thus
∑7
k=0 djt = 1 and the base choice d0t = 1 involves setting (ht, bt, wt) =
(0, 0, 0). Since purchasing the first home is a once-in-a-lifetime decision, if
ht = 1 then hτ = 0 for all τ ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T}, and hence
∑3
j=0 djt = 1. In this
way the model restricts homeowners to four (two) choices each period until
(after) age T1, while tenants pick one of the eight (four).
3.2 Household preferences
The household derives utility from consumption, leisure, offspring, and hous-
ing. Her preferences are characterized by a discounted sum of a time-additively
separable, constant absolute risk-aversion utility function.6 We model the
household’s lifetime utility from age t onwards as:
−
∞∑
τ=t
7∑
j=0
βs−tdjs exp(−uhjτ − uljτ − ubjτ − ρcτ − εjτ ) (1)
where β denotes the subjective discount factor, ρ is the constant absolute risk
aversion parameter, uht ≡ htuht indexes the expected lifetime utility payoff
from becoming a homeowner, ult ≡ wtult indexes the current utility payoff from
leisure time, ubt ≡ btubt indexes the discounted utility stream from a(nother)
birth, and εjt is a nonsystematic component of the flow utility capturing a
choice-specific idiosyncratic taste shock for each (j, t).
6. We adopt the CARA utility function, because we lack reliable information on wealth.
During the period of 1968 - 1993, the PSID provides detailed questions on household wealth
for only two years, 1984 and 1989, insufficient for modeling of changes in household wealth
within a dynamic framework. As explained in Margiotta and Miller (2000), the CARA
assumption is useful in this context because it is consistent with consumption smoothing
from accumulated wealth and accommodates risk aversion in a parsimonious fashion.
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The indices for homeownership, leisure and births are themselves mappings
of socioeconomic demographics, partly determined by past and current inter-
active choices. In our framework homeownership confers upon the household
a right to adapt their living quarters to their own lifestyle in ways that a
landlord might object.7 We define the homeownership index as:
uht ≡ x′tθ0 + x′tstθ1 + θ20s2t + θ21stst−1 + θ3stlt (2)
where st measures house size in period t, lt ∈ [0, 1] is female labor supply in t,
and xt is a set of fixed or time varying attributes that characterize the decision
maker (age, education and marital status) along with previous fertility and
labor-market outcomes. Presumably uht is concave increasing in st, implying
θ20 < 0. The rationale for including st−1 in the index is that when moving
from a rental unit to homeownership, the change in size reflects the terms
of trade between renting and owning: for example, relatively larger homes
tend to be purchased if rental accommodation is relatively expensive. The
last expression in (2) is an interaction with current labor supply that captures
whether purchase is more likely to occur when the woman is working, and by
extension whether she is more likely to work in the future.
The indices for fertility and labor supply follow the literature.8 The lifetime
utility of giving birth and raising one more child is given by:
ubt ≡ x′tγ0 (3)
where the marginal lifetime utility of a second child is affected by the age of
the first through xt. Finally, we define:
ult ≡ x′tδ0 + δ1x′tlt + δ20l2t + δ21ltlt−1 (4)
7. In this way we implicitly treat moral hazard issues arising from tenants lack of care
for the premises they rent, and other agency issues associated with landlord/tenant rela-
tionships.
8. See for example Hotz and Miller (1988), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Altug and Miller
(1998), Francesconi (2002) and Gayle and Miller (2006).
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where x′tδ0 is the fixed cost of working, and lagged labor supply affects the
marginal utility of current leisure, defined as 1− lt.
3.3 Budget constraint
Denote by et household financial wealth at the beginning of period t. House-
hold income from real wages paid to the female if she works in period t, is
denoted by Yt. Rent in period t, denoted by R(st, qt), depends on house size
st, quality and aggregate factors qt, as does the price of a house, denoted by
H(st, qt). These definitions imply the law of motion for household wealth is:
et+1 =

(1 + it) [et − ct +
∑3
j=0 djtYt −R(st, qt)] if hτ = 0 for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , t}
(1 + it) [et − ct +
∑8
j=4 djTYT −
∑7
j=4 djT (1 + ϕ)H(sT , qT )] if ht = 1
(1 + it) [et − ct +
∑8
j=4 djTYT ] if hτ = 1 for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}
(5)
where it denotes the one-period interest rate in period t, and ϕ is the real
estate commission rate incurred by household upon completing the transaction
of home purchase. To simplify the econometric implementation of our model,
rather than imposing stationarity in the economy, we assume house prices,
aggregate wages and interest rates to fluctuate over time, but can be perfectly
forecasted. Thus fertility and homeownership decisions are not driven by short
term financial exigencies in the model but by life-cycle considerations.
3.4 State variables
The state variables in the model include (1) those the household controls
directly, namely the composition of the household, labor-force experience, and
whether she owns her home or not, (2) state variables that affect life style
but are optimized outside the model conditional on the discrete choices made
inside the model, including the size and quality of housing accommodation,
and (3) calendar time, which captures future movements in the nonstationary
aggregates, including shifts in house prices, aggregate wages and interest rates.
The timing and spacing of children affect the benefits they confer upon the
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household. We track the number and ages of children until they turn 18, when
the child becomes a young adult and is assumed to leave the household. We
denote by ait the age of the i
th child in t for i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Let nt denote the
number of offspring living in the household in period t:
nt = nt−1 + bt−1 −
∑I
i=1
I {ait−1 = 17}
Thus at ≡ (a1t, . . . , aIt) represents both the number and ages of offspring under
18 in the household in period t.
The household also decides whether to work or not, but we do not model
how many hours labor-force participants work. Age, education, and hours
worked in the previous period affect her current wage rate. Denoting female
leisure by lt ∈ [0, 1], the last remark implies lagged leisure lt−1 is a state
variable. House size and quality is not directly determined by the household
in our framework, but nevertheless enters as a state variable because of their
intertemporal dependence.
3.5 Intertemporal choices
At the beginning of period t the household observes the vector of disturbances
to its preferences, εt ≡ (ε0t, . . . , ε7t) , her non-housing assets et and other state
variables described above, denoted by zt. Households are expected utility
maximizers, sequentially optimizing the expected value of (1) subject to (5)
by choosing j ∈ {0, . . . , 7} if they are currently tenants less than T1 years old,
and otherwise choosing from the more restricted choice sets we defined.
We define piH(st, qt) as the downpayment on a house priced at H(st, qt) in
period t and equal repayments in perpetuity starting in period t + 1 on the
loan (1− pi)H(st, qt) by R˜(st, qt). A competitive loans market implies:
R˜(st, qt) = (1− pi)H(st, qt)
∑∞
τ=t
∏τ
r=t
(1 + ir)
−1 ≡ (1− pi)H(st, qt) (Bt − 1)
where Bt is the current price of a bond in t that pays one consumption unit
each period in perpetuity. Denoting disposable income net of housing expenses
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by yjt, it follows that:
yjt ≡

∑3
j=0 djtYt −R(st, qt) if hτ = 0 for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , t}∑7
j=4 djt [Yt − (pi + ϕ)H(st, qt)] if ht = 1∑3
j=0 djtYt − R˜(sτ , qτ ) if hτ = 1 for some τ ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}
Let pjt (zt) denote the probability of choosing j at year t conditional on the
value of the household state variable vector zt (but not et), and denote by
ε∗jt the truncated variable that takes on the value of εjt only when djt = 1.
Adapting Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2015) to our framework, let AT+1 (zT+1) ≡
1, and recursively define an index of household capital for a household at year
t as:
At (zt) ≡
7∑
j=0
pjt (zt) exp
(
−uhjt − ubjt − uljt − ρyjt
Bt
)
Ejt
[
exp
(−ε∗jt
Bt
)]
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt
(6)
where z
(j)
t+1 is the value of the state vector at t + 1 following the choice j in
period t applied to zt, the value of the state vector in period t. The index
is strictly positive; lower values of At (zt) come from higher current income
and lower rent, both incorporated within yjt, as well as less distasteful xt
values that increase the sum of the three indices, uhjt + u
b
jt + u
l
jt. Denote by
dot = (d
o
1t, . . . , d
o
7t) the discrete choices that along with the optimal consumption
choices, cot , maximize the expected value of (1) subject to (5) . The theorem
below shows that all the household dynamics are transmitted through At (zt).
Theorem 1. For each t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} the optimal choices dot maximize:
7∑
j=0
djt
[
ρyjt + u
h
jt + u
b
jt + u
l
jt − (Bt − 1) lnAt+1(z(j)t+1) + εjt
]
(7)
Intuitively, the household maximizes a weighted sum of net current income,
the three indices in current utility, which in the case of a birth and homeown-
ership also impound the future benefits of making a durable choice, as well
as adjustments to household capital that reflect the option value for delaying
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homeownership, the impact of gaining work experience, and changes to family
composition.
3.6 Identification and estimation
The model is identified from (7) up to a probability distribution for εt ≡
(ε0t, . . . , ε7t) and normalizing constants for each state.
9 We assume εjt is in-
dependently and identically distributed as a Type I extreme value with loca-
tion and scale parameters (0, 1). Let pjt (zt) ≡ Et
[
dojt |zt
]
denote the condi-
tional choice probability (CCP) of optimally making the jth choice. Noting
uh0t = u
b
0t = u
l
0t = 0, it is well known that under this parameterization of the
disturbances:
ln
[
pjt (zt)
p0t (zt)
]
= ρ (yjt − y0t) + uhjt + ubjt + uljt − (Bt − 1) ln
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)

Let z
(j)
τ define the value of the state vector in period τ ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T},
when choice j made at t is followed by choice zero for all successive periods.
Estimation is based on successively telescoping ln[At+1(z
(j)
t+1)/At+1(z
(0)
t+1)] into
the future through to the end of the discrete choice phase at T . The following
theorem provides the basis for the CCP estimator used in our application.
Theorem 2. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , 7} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T}:
ln
[
pjt (zt)
p0t (zt)
]
= ρ (yjt − y0t) + uhjt + ubjt + uljt +
T∑
τ=t+1
τ∏
r=t+1
(
1
1 + ir
)
ln
p0τ
(
z
(0)
τ
)
p0τ
(
z
(j)
τ
)

−
∞∑
τ=t+1
τ∏
r=t+1
(
1
1 + ir
)
ρ
[
R˜(st, qt)−R (sτ , qτ )
]
(8)
This theorem shows that the log odds of the conditional-choice probability
9. See Hotz and Miller (1993), Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and Arcidiacono and Miller
(2019). In fact this model is overidentified because the coefficients on preferences are not
separately indexed by calendar time and state.
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in period t for buying a house and working but not giving birth (setting d6t =
1), versus the base choice of not working, not giving birth and continuing
to rent (setting d0t = 1), depends on four factors. First is the difference
in net income this period yjt − y0t, scaled by the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion ρ. The second factor is the difference in current utility this period
uhjt + u
b
jt + u
l
jt and the one from the baseline setting with (ht, bt, lt) = (0, 0, 0).
Third is the difference in the discounted streams of rental payments from
period t + 1 onwards, where both streams are generated by making the base
choice, but one stream begins with the household owning a home and the
other pertains to a household who never becomes a homeowner; the terms
involving R˜(st, qt) − R (sτ , qτ ) on the second line of (8) comprise this factor.
The remaining terms in (8), a discounted sum of future CCPs, are correction
factors to account for the fact that always choosing the base action in future
periods is not optimal.10
The estimation of the primitives in equation (8) follows a two-step strategy.
The first step nonparametrically estimates the CCPs as nuisance parameters
using a kernel estimator. The CCP estimates are substituted into equation
(8), and the parameters of the utility function are estimated off the empirical
counterpart to the resulting moment conditions. Further details about the
estimation procedure can be found in the Appendix.
4 Results
This section presents the structural parameter estimates of household prefer-
ences and compares the model predictions with in-sample behavior. First we
report on model fit by comparing household choices predicted by the model
with choices observed in the data, and then we discuss the estimated utility
function that characterizes the benefits of homeownership, children and leisure.
10. See Proposition 1 of Hotz and Miller (1993).
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Figure 5: One-period in-sample model prediction vs data.
4.1 Model fit
From the PSID sample we obtain relative frequencies on homeownership,
labor-force participation and number of children, conditional on the state vari-
ables in the previous year, and compare these cell estimates with the model’s
predictions for one period ahead. The results of this exercise are reported in
Figure 5. This figure compares homeownership rate, home size, labor-force
participation rate, and number of children per household generated by the
model to the analogous data characteristics computed from the PSID sample.
Figure 5 illustrates that our model closely tracks in-sample one-period-
ahead predictions for homeownership, home size, labor supply and the number
of children in a family relative to outcomes observed in the data for house-
holders between 22 and 45. The model closely matches homeownership choices
from age 25 and on, but over-predicts homeownership rate for the very young
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households between age 22 and 25. Home size is closely matched as well.
The model matches the overall level of labor-force participation, somewhat
over-predicting working by the very young females, but staying within five
percentage points from then on. The model provides a close description of the
average number of children born to the households over the life cycle, reach-
ing the peak at about age 35, followed by a decline. In summary the model
generates choices that track the life-cycle trends in homeownership, labor-force
participation and family size, closely matching the choices observed in the data
within the life phases we are focused on.
4.2 Utility parameters
Table 2 reports the estimated utility function, grouped by the utility compo-
nents given in equation (1), which incorporates parameters for the utility from
housing services (2), raising children (3), and the disutility from working (4).
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimated parameters of the fixed utility of
buying a home (along with their estimated standard errors), column (2) shows
the estimates of the utility of home size, column (3) reports the estimates of
the utility of raising children, while columns (4) and (5) respectively report
the coefficient estimates of the fixed and marginal disutility from working.
Before describing the estimates in detail, we note that the trend evident
in the time series in Figure 4, away from becoming homeowners earlier in
life towards buying larger homes when they are older, has a cross-sectional
analogue. Households face a trade off between buying a smaller house earlier
in life and being a home owner for a greater number of years, versus holding
out for a larger residence that is lived in for fewer years: demographic groups
that buy earlier tend to own smaller homes, and vice versa. There is only one
exception to this rule: the older the youngest child, the less likely a renting
household buys a home, and conditional on purchase, the smaller the home is
likely to be. Loosely speaking, the shorter the time frame in which the maximal
number of members anticipate living together, and the longer the delay until
that the time frame, the lower the premium the household is willing to pay
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for space. In this way the size of the first home evolves over the lifecycle of a
household that rents as it decides when to switch. However the time trend in
Figure 4 is not simply a composition effect of the results displayed in Table 2:
a major demographic shift in this sample is the increased formal education of
women, yet higher education is associated with the earlier purchase of a smaller
home, at odds with the aggregate trend towards buying later and bigger.
Turning to the estimates, as indicated by the rows 2 and 3 in Table 2, buy-
ing a first home and having a child in the same year gives the strong disutility
from simultaneously doing both, only exacerbated by concurrently working.
Intuitively, undertaking all three activities at once is overwhelming. Column
(2) shows the estimated utility from house size is increasing and concave. We
find that new homeowners choose larger homes relative to the size of the pre-
viously rented homes, consistent with the stylized fact that rental-occupied
housing is typically smaller than owner-occupied housing. Our findings sup-
port the hypothesis that amongst other factors, households value accommoda-
tion by the amount of total time spent at home, as roughly measured by the
product of the number of household members and the frequency with which
they spend time at home. Thus column (1) shows the utility from becoming
a homeowner is initially increasing (with the addition of a spouse and a first
child) but declines in household size thereafter. On this interpretation util-
ity diminishes as the children grow older, aging children having the opposite
effect of an aging spouse, because the former grow detached and eventually
leave the household. On another dimension of time spent at home, working
women, and those with greater market capital (as measured by labor-force
participation in the previous period, which increases current wages) tend to
prefer smaller homes. Such households are likely to spend less time at home,
therefore benefit less during waking hours from housing space, and have less
leisure time for housing upkeep, which is greater in bigger houses.
The estimated utility of becoming a homeowner is higher for younger and
more educated women, but in the case of married women, dampened by having
a younger and more educated spouse. Higher formal education is correlated
with skills that facilitate business transactions in property acquisition. On the
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Table 2: Period-Specific Utility
uht = ht(x
′
tθ0 + x
′
tstθ1 + θ20s
2
t + θ21stst−1 + θ3stlt)
ubt = btx
′
tγ0
ult = wt(x
′
tδ0 + δ1x
′
tlt + δ20l
2
t + δ21ltlt−1)
Utility from:
home
purchase
home
size
birth work
work
hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ht× st× bt× wt× lt×
Constant 1.10
(0.47)
0.62
(0.08)
2.12
(0.19)
0.01
(0.17)
5.75
(0.91)
Work 0.60
(0.50)
−4.05
(0.25)
Birth −3.25
(0.49)
Work*Birth −22.77
(0.52)
Demographic characteristics (xt)
Female age −0.20
(0.01)
0.04
(0.01)
−0.42
(0.01)
−0.03
(0.01)
0.07
(0.02)
Female education 0.44
(0.03)
−0.07
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
0.13
(0.01)
−0.45
(0.05)
Husbands age 0.09
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.07
(0.02)
Husbands education −0.51
(0.03)
0.08
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
−0.08
(0.01)
0.26
(0.04)
Single −10.26
(0.54)
0.41
(0.09)
−5.78
(0.22)
1.66
(0.20)
−11.62
(1.02)
Non-White −8.94
(0.20)
0.48
(0.04)
−0.57
(0.08)
−1.33
(0.07)
9.52
(0.40)
Single*Non-White −23.63
(0.50)
2.38
(0.09)
5.27
(0.17)
−1.13
(0.15)
13.61
(0.76)
Children at t− 1 3.67
(0.14)
−0.15
(0.02)
4.29
(0.05)
−0.73
(0.04)
−2.99
(0.24)
Children sq. at t− 1 −2.84
(0.04)
0.14
(0.01)
−2.47
(0.02)
0.08
(0.01)
−0.42
(0.06)
Age of last child −0.34
(0.02)
−0.06
(0.01)
−1.48
(0.01)
0.12
(0.01)
−0.39
(0.03)
Homeowner at t− 1 2.65
(0.06)
−0.65
(0.04)
5.11
(0.21)
Single*Homeowner at t− 1 −16.37
(0.15)
−1.00
(0.17)
8.33
(0.74)
Current home size (st) −0.05
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
Prior home size (st−1) 0.01
(0.00)
Employed at t− 1 (dwt−1) 0.19
(0.04)
1.43
(0.03)
Work time (lt) −2.11
(0.03)
−130.93
(0.85)
Work time at t− 1 (lt−1) −0.30
(0.03)
97.43
(0.58)
flip side, spouses with less formal education have a comparative advantage in
home maintenance, which utilizes manual skills not taught much in schools.
Similarly homeownership confers greater control and security over one’s living
arrangements, features we think are more highly valued by younger women
and married women with older spouses. Finally, utility from homeownership
is smaller for non-white households, consistent with the lower homeownership
rates for these population segments.
While the choices households make about buying their first home are infor-
mative about its value to them, the value derived from their labor supply and
fertility choices are affected by their housing status. Column (3) shows the
utility of married women from having a(nother) child is enhanced by living in
their own home, although this is emphatically not true for single women. More
generally these findings are consistent with empirical evidence that homeown-
ership is beneficial for families with children (Green and White 1997; Haurin,
Parcel, and Haurin 2002), and is highly correlated with the fertility decisions
(O¨st 2012). Homeownership also affects the (mainly nonpecuniary) costs and
benefits of labor supply, raising the cost of participation, as reported in col-
umn (4), but for those women supplying labor reducing the burden of working
extra hours, column (5). Thus homeowners tend towards a lower labor-force
participation, but if they work, tend to choose longer working hours (which is
consistent with having longer commuting costs, amongst other factors). This
last finding contrasts with Table 1 which shows that if we do not condition on
the characteristics of the household, the average number of hours worked by
homeowners is lower.
Our findings on the utility of giving birth to a child and the disutility of
working and work hours, presented in columns (3) - (5) are also intuitive.
The utility of giving birth decreases with age and is larger for more educated
households: these effects capture the higher fertility rates of more educated
older households relative to less educated households, who tend to complete
their families at an earlier age. The utility from giving birth is lower for single
households, higher if a family already has children, and increasing in the age
of their youngest child: since young children draw their mothers from the
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workforce, and human capital from working depreciates with absence, there
are investment gains from bunching.
The utility of work declines with age, is higher for more educated and
single households, and lower for non-white households. It is decreasing with
children but higher for households with older children. Households are more
likely to work if they worked in the previous periods. The utility of supply of
working hours is increasing and concave. It is increasing with age, is lower for
more educated and single households, and higher for non-white households.
The utility from working hours is decreasing with the number of children in a
family and with the age of youngest child.
5 Counterfactual Decompositions
In our model, first home purchase, household composition and size, as well as
female labor supply, are endogenous variables driven by predetermined school-
ing attainment, and prices, namely wages, housing and interest rates, that in-
dividual households are too small to affect through their own decisionmaking.
Figure 6 shows that over this period educational attainment and female wages
more or less monotonically increased, house prices peaked and slumped three
times with an overall upward trend, while roughly speaking interest rates were
quite volatile, rising in the first half of the period and falling in the second
half. To disentangle the strength of these factors on the endogenous variables,
the last part of our analysis conducts counterfactual simulations, by quantify-
ing the response of homeownership, labor-force participation and child birth
to greater education, wage increases, increasing house prices and changes in
interest rates.
Although any given factor might be dominant in predicting a particular
counterfactual simulation (for example, wages on labor supply), it is difficult
to cleanly isolate the effect of each, as they are tightly interconnected both
contemporaneously and through dynamic propagation. The simulations com-
pare steady state allocations in an economy populated by households with the
estimated utility function where wages, education attainment, interest rates
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and house prices are comparable to those found at different points in the data.
First, we construct two benchmark simulations for steady state economies ap-
proximating conditions in 1971 at the beginning of our data sample, and two
decades later towards the end of the sample, in 1991. Then we simulate four
further steady state economies, by changing just one factor at a time from its
1971 level to its level in 1991.
From a theoretical perspective house prices, interest rates and wages are
endogenous within a general equilibrium framework, jointly determined by the
preferences we estimate, as well as the supply of rental versus owned housing,
the demand for labor, and the supply of credit. The fluctuations in house
prices and interest rates are a major source of aggregate nonstationarities that
our estimation procedure accounts for, but it would be a huge computational
challenge to also solve for the general equilibrium of a nonstationary economy,
further complicated by the fact that household decisions made towards the end
of the sample are partly determined by aggregate effects that are only revealed
after the sample ends. Although our approach is not definitive, it accounts
for the endogeneity and dynamics of household composition, labor supply and
first home purchase, and therefore gives insight from the impact of the most
important driving factors.
5.1 Benchmark economies
According to Figure 6, the early parts of the data are characterized by the
lower levels of education, a lower wage rate for a standardized skill unit which
is captured by the time fixed effects, and relatively low levels of house price
index and interest rates. Imposing these starting characteristics, we simulate
benchmark patterns in homeownership, labor-force participation and children
using the estimated model parameters. Appendix B explains how each station-
ary economy was simulated. Briefly, using the PSID sample we first estimated
processes for the house size, marital status and wages as a function of the
state variables. Then we solved the dynamic programming model recursively
for different household types and cohorts at the steady states.
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Figure 6: Educational attainment for female population 15 years old and over mea-
sured as the average years of total schooling, constructed based on data from Barro
and Lee (2013). Wage rate is computed by the authors based on the PSID data
sample. US National Home Price Index is based on Shiller (2015), whereas one-year
Treasury constant maturity rate (GS1) is retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. Decennial Censuses (Ruggles et al. 2019) are used for construc-
tion of 1970 – 1990 homeownership rates.
The top panel in Table 3 summarizes homeownership rates, average home
size, labor-force participation and average number of children for the bench-
mark 1971 stationary economy where the distribution of household types,
wages, house prices and interest rates are set to their 1971 values. Further,
Table 4 reports average age at first child, first homeownership and labor-force
participation rate for householders before and after age 35. Table 4 shows,
in the 1971 stationary model economy the average age at first birth is 22.9
years, 78 percent of younger women (ages 25 - 34) work while the labor-force
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Table 3: Counterfactual simulation results
21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45
Benchmark for 1971
Homeownership rate 0.45 0.70 0.82 0.91 0.95
Home size 4.96 5.43 6.00 6.46 6.67
Labor force participation 0.88 0.77 0.67 0.62 0.74
Children 0.92 1.39 1.94 1.67 1.14
Benchmark for 1991
Homeownership rate 0.45 0.70 0.83 0.91 0.95
Home size 4.76 4.80 5.23 5.64 5.84
Labor force participation 0.92 0.85 0.76 0.72 0.82
Children 0.75 1.16 1.65 1.49 1.03
Steady state change
∆ Homeownership rate -0.7% -0.3% 0.3% -0.5% -0.9%
∆ Home size -4.2% -11.5% -12.8% -12.6% -12.4%
∆ Labor force participation 4.1% 7.5% 9.5% 9.6% 7.7%
∆ Children -18% -16% -15% -11% -10%
A. Wage as in 1991
Homeownership rate
Experiment 0.42 0.63 0.76 0.88 0.94
Difference -3.6% -7.6% -6.3% -3.3% -1.3%
Home size
Experiment 4.94 5.35 5.98 6.6 6.89
Difference -0.4% -1.5% -0.3% 1.9% 3.4%
Labor force participation
Experiment 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.90
Difference 4.3% 9.7% 15.4% 18.9% 15.6%
Children
Experiment 0.83 1.09 1.35 0.97 0.58
Difference -10% -21% -30% -42% -50%
B. Education level as in 1991
Homeownership rate
Experiment 0.46 0.74 0.86 0.93 0.96
Difference 0.6% 3.4% 3.5% 1.5% 0.9%
Home size
Experiment 4.88 5.30 5.88 6.24 6.42
Difference -1.7% -2.4% -1.9% -3.3% -3.7%
Labor force participation
Experiment 0.89 0.79 0.68 0.62 0.73
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Table 3 continued
21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45
Difference 1.3% 1.8% 1.6% -0.3% -1.0%
Children
Experiment 0.79 1.28 1.87 1.74 1.23
Difference -14% -8% -3% 4% 8%
C. House prices as in 1991
Homeownership rate
Experiment 0.44 0.68 0.79 0.89 0.93
Difference -0.9% -2.6% -3.2% -2.5% -2.2%
Home size
Experiment 4.86 5.06 5.51 6.00 6.23
Difference -2.0% -6.8% -8.2% -7.1% -6.6%
Labor force participation
Experiment 0.88 0.78 0.68 0.64 0.76
Difference 0.0% 0.4% 1.0% 1.4% 1.2%
Children
Experiment 0.91 1.37 1.90 1.62 1.10
Difference 0% -1% -2% -3% -4%
D. Interest rate as in 1991
Homeownership rate
Experiment 0.48 0.76 0.87 0.94 0.97
Difference 3.1% 6.0% 4.9% 2.8% 1.4%
Home size
Experiment 4.96 5.37 5.87 6.22 6.36
Difference 0.0% -1.0% -2.2% -3.7% -4.6%
Labor force participation
Experiment 0.87 0.72 0.57 0.49 0.63
Difference -1.4% -5.2% -10.2% -13.6% -11.7%
Children
Experiment 0.99 1.63 2.37 2.18 1.54
Difference 9% 17% 23% 31% 35%
participation rate for older women (between 35 and 45) is 67 percent, and the
average age at becoming a homeowner is 28 years.These statistics are remark-
ably close to the data patterns for the PSID documented in Figure 1, and in
the economy at large. According the National Vital Statistical System, the
average age of mother at first birth in the US was about 22 in 1970s (Mathews
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and Hamilton 2002). While nationally representative records on the average
age at first homeownership are scarce, Figure 3 shows the average age at first
homeownership in 1970s is around 27.
By 1991 the wage rate had almost doubled, average schooling per female
increased by about 1.5 years, house prices grew by about 15 percent and
interest rates were 1 percentage point higher than in 1971. The steady state
for 1991 is calculated in a similar way to the 1971 economy: we hold the
distribution of household types unchanged from 1971, adjust the prices to
their 1991 values, and then resolve the optimization model. As Table 3 shows,
the effect on homeownership is slightly ambiguous; it falls for all cohorts except
the 31 - 35 cohort. Overall the homeownership rate declines by 0.4 percent, but
the average age at becoming a homeowner in the benchmark of 1991 also falls
slightly from 28.0 to 27.8 (see Table 4). Table 4 further shows, with regards
to fertility and labor supply, the average age at first child increased to 23.5,
labor-force participation increased by 7 percentage points up to 85 percent for
younger women (ages 25 - 34), and by 9 percentage points up to 76 percent
for older women (ages 35 - 44).
5.2 Wages
The first policy experiment constitutes an overall and permanent increase in
base wages from its level in 1971 to the level reached by 1991, almost double
the 1971 level (as Figure 6 shows). Table 4 shows higher wages increase the
opportunity cost of leisure and child care, increasing labor-force participation
by 9 (18) percent for women less (more) than 35 (and less than 45) years old,
and resulting in less children per household, and increased childless. Panel A
of Table 3 shows that the differences are most stark at about age 35, where
the gap between labor force participation rates is about 19 percent and the
reduction in the average number of children per family is about 0.7. The longer
a woman postpones giving birth, the higher the wages from accumulated work
experience, and consequently the more attractive work and the weaker the
incentives to give birth. The reduction in fertility later in a life cycle resulted
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Table 4: Counterfactual simulation results
Average age at LFP (%)
first
child
first
homeownership
before
age 35
after
age 35
Benchmark in 1971 22.9 28.0 78 67
Benchmark in 1991 23.5 27.8 85 76
A. Wage as in 1991 21.6 29.3 87 85
B. Education level as in 1991 23.7 27.5 79 67
C. House prices as in 1991 22.9 28.4 78 68
D. Interest rate as in 1991 23.3 27.0 72 55
in the average age at first birth shifting to earlier, now being 21.6 (see Table
4).
The effect of higher base wages on housing demand operates through mul-
tiple channels. All else equal, higher labor-market compensation and greater
wealth increases spending on housing (and other goods), inducing homeown-
ership at younger ages. However the substitution effect away from domestic
activities, including leisure and child rearing reduces the demand for home-
ownership, a complementary good. The second effect, most evident in Table
3 from the decline in the number of children for all cohorts, dominates the
first, leading to less homeownership. Panel A of Table 3 reports homeowner-
ship falls for every cohort, the average age at first home purchase rising by
1.3 years to 29.3 (see Table 4). The effect on home size is mixed: the solution
to the estimated model shows that higher wages induce women to substitute
smaller families and larger homes purchased later in life for larger families and
smaller homes purchased earlier in life.
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5.3 Education
The next policy experiment compares the benchmark 1971 steady state out-
comes with those of a steady state in which education is increased by 1.5 years,
roughly the amount Figure 6 shows average schooling per female increased be-
tween 1970 and 1990. Table 2 shows more educated females exhibit stronger
preferences than the less educated towards home purchase, placing a lower pre-
mium on home size, and also towards offspring, by itself an impetus for home
ownership. Because they command higher wage rates (reported in Table 5 of
Appendix B), working is also more lucrative. This potentially gives a third
reason for buying a home, since working females place a higher reservation
price on owning a home than nonworkers.
Solving the model with higher educational attainment, Panel B of Table 3
shows that the homeownership rate rises for every cohort. Furthermore Table
4 shows the average age at the time of purchasing the first home declining
by approximately 6 months. The trade off between age at purchase and size
of home, evident in the cross section, is reinforced here: Table 3 shows the
size of an average first home shrinks in this experiment. We conclude that
if anything, increased educational attainment dampened the trend away from
home ownership over this period.
While not the main focus of this study, the effects on life cycle labor supply
and fertility are also noteworthy. Overall there are fewer children, but because
average age at first birth increases by almost a year (Table 4), the number of
children in older households, that is for women over 35, rises, as show in Panel
B of Table 3. Our findings suggest delaying fertility is matched by younger
women increasing their labor supply, and women over 40 reducing it.
5.4 House prices
We also investigate how a 15 percent increase in house prices, the net increase
over the two decades starting 1971, would affect steady state allocations. In-
tuitively the wealth effect reduces the demand for all normal goods, while
the substitution effect encourages households to reallocate their consumption
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bundle away from homeownership to other goods. Panel C of Table 3 shows
the intuition for a static framework extends to this dynamic context, with
the wealth effect dominating the substitution effect for nonhousing goods, not
surprising given the share of expenditure on accommodation within the total
household budget. Both the home ownership rate and the house size fall for
every cohort (Table 3), while the average age at first purchase rise by 0.4 years
(Table 4), implying even those who buy spend less of their summed discounted
lifetime time in their own home. Fertility falls for all but the youngest cohort,
where there is no change, yet labor-force participation increases for all cohorts
except the youngest, essentially reducing nonwork time as well.
These results also highlight a major finding of our study. Comparing Panels
A and C in Table 3, with the exception of the oldest cohort, the effect of
increased female wages is markedly greater than the effect of rising house
prices on the homeownership rate, and from Table 4, on the timing of first
home purchase as well. Raising house prices and raising female wages have the
same qualitative effects on home ownership rates and age at first purchase, but
the quantitative impact of higher wages is greater: the key to understanding
this result is that wages almost doubled but house prices only increased by
about 15 percent. Nevertheless rising house prices do have a more pronounced
negative effect on one dimension: when prices rise the size of the first house
purchase falls across all cohorts by up to 8 percent, but when wages increase
the effect is ambiguous for the reasons mentioned above.
5.5 Interest rate
The final counterfactual exercise we conducted determines how sensitive the
endogenous choices are to interest-rate changes: following the same protocol
the benchmark model is simulated with the conditions of 1971, when interest
rate was 4.8 percent, and then with the 1991 rate, 5.8 percent. When the
interest rate rises, households, who are saving for the future, experience both
a positive wealth effect and a substitution towards market goods consumed
in the future. In our model households have completed their education, so
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they are reducing their debt and saving for retirement. The combination
of substitution and wealth effects are perhaps most apparent in labor-force
participation and fertility. Panel D of Table 3 shows the number of births
increase, especially later in life; similarly the women are less likely to work,
spending more time with children and on leisure, especially as they get older.
Homeownership increases for all cohorts, while the size of first homes declines.
Unlike wages, educational attainment and house prices that generally show
a steady growth over the period of 1970 - 1990, interest rates had a decade of
dramatic growth and then a decade of decline back to the levels of 1970s. For
this reason we are reluctant to take a stand on how those fluctuations might
have affected first home-purchase decisions over this period. We note though,
that this feature of the solution to our estimated model, homeownership rates
and interest rate moving together but house size moving in the opposite direc-
tion, corresponds to the stylized facts of more recent times out of sample: as
current interest rates hit historical lows, homeownership rates for the working
cohorts of population are also in decline (Goodman, Pendall, and Zhu 2015),
and home sizes for owners grow larger.11
6 Conclusion
The delay in first home purchase fully accounts for the decline in homeowner-
ship in the US over two decades spanning the 1970s through the 1990s. During
that time the average age of the first time home buyer and the average age of
the mother at first birth increased by two years, and female labor-force partici-
pation grew substantially. There is widespread agreement that these trends are
interrelated but previous empirical research has not sought to reconcile these
three life-cycle choices, fertility, female labor supply and home buying, to ex-
plain why Americans are making their first home purchase at an older age than
previous generations did. Our lifecycle optimization model seeks to explain
11. Reducing the interest rate by 1 percentage point in the benchmark model yields results
similar to those reported in Panel D of Table 3, but with the opposite sign, results that are
available from the authors upon request.
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these trends within a competitive paradigm based on household responses to
market fundamentals and changing demographics, specifically higher wages,
greater education, higher house prices and fluctuating interest rates. Our dy-
namic model provides an intuitive transmission mechanism linking the female
labor market, fertility, and the housing market, and yields plausible estimates
from the PSID data. Our counterfactuals provide a dynamic decomposition
to explain what happened during the sample period.
One might speculate that higher levels of education would lead to lower
homeownership, because college graduates start their working careers years af-
ter those with high school education, delay childbirth and have smaller families.
We find no support for this conjecture. Highly educated females value home-
ownership more than less educated women. Furthermore controlling for the
upward shift in female wages, a stronger schooling background increases labor-
force participation; this also brings forward home purchase because working
females also exhibit a preference for homeownership. Taken together these two
factors more than offset the combined effect on homeownership of later entry
into the workforce and the prospect of smaller families.
Similarly we find no evidence that financial markets played an important
role. Our estimated dynamic optimization model rationalizes why lower inter-
est rates lead to reduced homeownership: savers lose wealth, leading them to
decrease their consumption at every point in their life, and postpone their first
home purchase. On this score our model correctly predicts, out of sample, that
the trend towards postponing first home ownership would be exacerbated after
the sample period ended because of lower interest rates. In principle a more
complicated model than ours might also incorporate borrowing constraints
and other housing market imperfections. We are skeptical the additional com-
plexity can be justified. What is the compelling institutional feature that has
increasingly curbed the ability of households to borrow for home purchase? In
the years following our sample period the transition rate to homeownership
further slowed, although interest rates continued to fall and by many accounts
borrowing for homeownership became easier.
This essentially leaves two factors to explain why the American dream was
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delayed. First, housing prices increased over this period and, not surprisingly,
reduced homeownership. Second, since first home purchase is coordinated
with fertility outcomes, the solution to our dynamic model with the estimated
parameters shows that the indirect effect of higher wages was to delay home-
ownership, because higher wages increased the opportunity cost of childcare,
leading to postponing first birth, raising smaller families, and thus lowering and
postponing the demand for homeownership. In short, we find there is strong
complementarity between homeownership and raising children, who became
more expensive relative to alternative uses of time and money. Empirically
the magnitude of this transmission mechanism proved comparable to, if not
more important than, the effect of increased house prices, in retarding first
home purchases.
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A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Define the date zero price of a bond that pays a con-
sumption unit each period from date t onwards as:
B˜t ≡
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + i(s)
)
= B˜t+1 +
1
1 + i(t)
where i(t) ≡ ∏ts=0 (1 + is) − 1 is the compound interest rate over the first t
periods. Let:
Q˜t ≡
∞∑
s=t
ln
[
βs
(
1 + i(s)
)]
(1 + i(s))
= Q˜t+1 +
ln
[
βt
(
1 + i(t)
)]
(1 + i(t))
For convenience we also define:
αjt ≡ exp
(
uhjt + u
b
jt + u
l
jt
)
(9)
and note that α0t = 1 for all t.
After making all its discrete choices before period T , the household chooses
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its remaining lifetime consumption profile {ct}∞t=T+1 to maximize:
−
∞∑
t=T+1
βt exp (−ρct) (10)
subject to a sequence of budget constraints:
(1 + it)
−1 et+1 ≤ et − ct
The indirect utility function for this Lagrangian problem is:
VT+1 (eT+1) = −B˜T+1 exp
(
Q˜T+1
B˜T+1
− ρeT+1
(1 + i(T+1)) B˜T+1
)
Suppose a household with state variables zT makes choice j at age T for
one period and then retires. Let yjT denote net income for the last period in
which the household makes discrete choices; it includes wage income for the
last period and the discounted sum of all future rents:
yjT = (1− ljT )wT −
[
1 + i(T )
] ∞∑
t=T+1
R
(
s
(j)
t , q
(j)
t
)
(1 + i(t))
Note that future rents payable depend on the final housing choice. After
selecting choice j, and receiving income yjT , she chooses consumption and
next period’s endowment (cT , eT+1) optimally to maximize:
−βTαjT exp (−εjT ) exp (−ρcT )− B˜T+1 exp
(
Q˜T+1
B˜T+1
− ρeT+1
(1 + i(T+1)) B˜T+1
)
(11)
subject of her budget constraint:
eT
1 + i(T )
+
yjT
1 + i(T )
=
eT+1
1 + i(T+1)
+
cT
1 + i(T )
Denoting by VjT (eT ) the discounted sum of expected utility for a householder
of age T onwards with wealth eT who chooses j and makes optimal consump-
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tion choices thereafter, we can apply Lagrangian methods to show:
VjT (eT ) = −B˜Tα1/B˜T (1+i
(T ))
jT exp
{
Q˜T
B˜T
− εjT
B˜T [1 + i(T )]
− ρ (eT + yjT )
B˜T [1 + i(T )]
}
=
−BT
(1 + i(T ))
α
1
BT
jT exp
[
QT
BT
− εjT
BT
− ρ (eT + yjT )
BT
]
(12)
where the second line exploits the relationships BT = B˜T
(
1 + i(T )
)
and QT =
Q˜T
(
1 + i(T )
)
.
Appealing to the definition of At (zt) given in the text, we can now prove
by an induction argument that, conditional on choosing j, the value function
at t discounted back to date zero is:
Vjt (et, zt, εjt) =
−Bt
(1 + i(t))
α
1
Bt
jt exp
[
Qt
Bt
− εjt
Bt
− ρ (et + yjt)
Bt
]
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt
(13)
At time t the household chooses j to maximize Vjt (et, zt, εjt). Since max-
imizing an objective function is equivalent to minimizing the logarithm of its
negative, the maximum can be found by minimizing:
ln
Bt
(1 + i(t))
+
lnαjt
Bt
+
Qt
Bt
− ρet + yjt
Bt
− εjt
Bt
+
(
1− 1
Bt
)
lnAt+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)
The proof is completed by multiplying the expression above by Bt, subtracting
terms that do not depend on j, appealing to (9) and rearranging.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is helpful to define the date zero price of a bond which
pays a consumption unit each from date t onwards as:
B˜t ≡
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + i(s)
)
= B˜t+1 +
1
1 + i(t)
(14)
where i(t) ≡ ∏ts=0 (1 + is) − 1 is the compound interest rate over the first t
periods, and that:
B˜t+1
B˜t
= 1− 1
B˜t [1 + i(t)]
= 1− 1
Bt
(15)
It is well known and note that if εjt is independently and identically dis-
tributed as a Type I extreme value with location and scale parameters (0, 1)
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then from Theorem 1:
ln
[
p0t (zt)
pjt (zt)
]
= ρy0t − (Bt − 1) lnAt+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)
−
[
ρyjt − ln (αjt)− (Bt − 1) lnAt+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)]
= ρ (y0t − yjt) + ln (αjt) + (Bt − 1) ln
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)

Exponentiating the result and raising to the power 1 /Bt , we obtain:
[
p0t (zt)
pjt (zt)
] 1
Bt
= α
1
Bt
jt exp
[
−ρ (yjt − y0t)
Bt
]At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)
1−
1
Bt
(16)
Rearranging equation (16) we obtain:
α
1
Bt
jt exp
(
−ρyjt
Bt
)
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt =
[
p0t (zt)
pjt (zt)
] 1
Bt
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt exp
(
−ρy0t
Bt
)
From the definition of At (zt):
At (zt) =
J∑
j=0
pjt (zt)α
1
Bt
jt E
[
exp
(
−ε
∗
jt
Bt
)]
exp
(
−ρyjt
Bt
)
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt (17)
Substituting the left hand side into the recursion for At given in Equation (17)
yields:
At (zt) =
J∑
j=0
pjt (zt)E
[
exp
(
−ε
∗
jt
Bt
)]
exp
(
−ρy0t
Bt
)[
p0t (zt)
pjt (zt)
] 1
Bt
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt
But from the online appendix of Gayle, Golan, and Miller 2015:
E
[
exp
(
−ε
∗
jt
Bt
)]
= pjt (zt)
1
Bt Γ
(
Bt + 1
Bt
)
where Γ (·) is the complete gamma function. Substituting for the left hand in
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the expression derived for At (zt) above it thus yields:
At (zt) = p0t (zt)
1
Bt Γ
(
Bt + 1
Bt
) J∑
j=0
pjt (zt) exp
(
−ρy0t
Bt
)
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt
= Γ
(
Bt + 1
Bt
)
p0t (zt)
1
Bt exp
(
−ρy0t
Bt
)
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)1− 1
Bt
or:
lnAt (zt) = ln Γ
(
Bt + 1
Bt
)
+
1
Bt
ln p0t (zt)− ρy0t
Bt
+
(
1− 1
Bt
)
lnAt+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)
Using this expression to difference logAt+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)
with logAt+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)
gives:
ln
[
At+1(z
(j)
t+1)
At+1(z
(0)
t+1)
]
=
1
Bt+1
{
ln
[
p0,t+1(z
(j)
t+1)
p0,t+1(z
(0)
t+1)
]
− ρ(y(j,t)t+1 − y(0,t)t+1 )
}
+
(
1− 1
Bt+1
)
ln
[
At+2(z
(j)
t+2)
At+2(z
(0)
t+2)
]
=
1
Bt+1
{
ln
[
p0,t+1(z
(j)
t+1)
p0,t+1(z
(0)
t+1)
]
− ρ(y(j,t)t+1 − y(0,t)t+1 )
}
+
B˜t+2
B˜t+1
ln
[
At+2(z
(j)
t+2)
At+2(z
(0)
t+2)
]
where the second line follows from (15). Telescoping to period T and appealing
to the fact that AT+1
(
z
(j)
T+1
)
= 1 yields:
ln
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)
 = T∑
s=t+1
1
Bs
s−1∏
r=t+1
B˜r+1
B˜r
ln
p0s
(
z
(j)
s
)
p0s
(
z
(0)
s
)
− ρ (y(j,t)s − y(0,t)s )

=
1
B˜t+1
T∑
s=t+1
B˜s
Bs
ln
p0s
(
z
(j)
s
)
p0s
(
z
(0)
s
)
− ρ (y(j,t)s − y(0,t)s )

=
1
B˜t+1
T∑
s=t+1
1
1 + i(s)
ln
p0s
(
z
(j)
s
)
p0s
(
z
(0)
s
)
− ρ (y(j,t)s − y(0,t)s )
(18)
Taking the logarithm of (16), multiplying by −Bt and substituting the expres-
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sion for At+1(z
(j)
t+1)/ At+1(z
(0)
t+1), obtained in (18), yields:
ln
[
pjt (zt)
p0t (zt)
]
= ρ (yjt − y0t)− ln (αjt) + (1−Bt) ln
At+1
(
z
(j)
t+1
)
At+1
(
z
(0)
t+1
)

= ρ (yjt − y0t)− ln (αjt) + (1−Bt)
B˜t+1
T∑
s=t+1
1
1 + i(s)
{
ln
[
p0s(z
(j)
s )
p0s(z
(0)
s )
]
− ρ(y(j,t)s − y(0,t)s )
}
But from (15):
B˜t+1 = B˜t − B˜t
Bt
=
B˜t (Bt − 1)
Bt
implying:
(1−Bt)
B˜t+1
= (1−Bt) Bt
B˜t (Bt − 1)
= −Bt
B˜t
= − [1 + i(t)]
Therefore:
ln
[
pjt (zt)
p0t (zt)
]
= ρ (yjt − y0t)− ln (αjt)−
T∑
s=t+1
1 + i(t)
1 + i(s)
ln
p0s
(
z
(j)
s
)
p0s
(
z
(0)
s
)
− ρ (y(j,t)s − y(0,t)s )

= ρ (yjt − y0t)− ln (αjt) +
T∑
s=t+1
s∏
r=t+1
1
1 + ir
{
ρ(y(j,t)s − y(0,t)s ) + ln
[
p0s(z
(0)
s )
p0s(z
(j)
s )
]}
Appealing to (9) and definition of y
(j,t)
s the theorem is proved.
B Simulation details
First we describe the elements of the state vector. Let t denote the age of a
female. Household fixed characteristics include education and race. Education
is divided into 4 categories, which correspond to “less than high school”, “high
school”, “some college”, and “college degree”. Race includes two categories:
white and non-white. Marital status is modelled as stochastic exogenous shock,
conditional on demographic characteristics. Aggregate factors include the level
of house prices and interest rates. Such elements of state vector, as homeowner
indicator, labor-force participation indicator, children and their ages, as well as
home size and hours of work supplied by the household arise through decision
making process within the model.
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We solve the model by computing conditional choice probabilities for each
combination of the state vector. The participation ratios pj,t, j = 0, ...J are
computed by solving the model backwards, starting from the termination con-
dition. Termination condition is set to occur at age 65 after which a household
retires and terminates. A household may enjoy a payoff period 64 payoff, how-
ever no future decisions are possible, which results in the ratio of conditional
choice probabilities being set to one: p0,65(z
(0)
65 )/p0,65(z
(j)
65 ) = 1, so that we have:
ln
pj,64(z64)
p0,64(z64)
= ρ (yj,64 − y0,64) + uhj,64 + ubj,64 + ulj,64. (19)
Equation (19) allows us to evaluate pj,64, j = 0, ...J , which are then being fed
into an equation for age 63:
ln
pj,63(z63)
p0,63(z63)
= ρ (yj,63 − y0,63) + uhj,63 + ubj,63 + ulj,63 +
(
1
1 + i
)
ln
[
pj,64(z64)
p0,64(z64)
]
−
(
1
1 + i
)
ρ
[
R˜(s63, q63)−R (z63)
]
.
The procedure is continued recursively until the age 22:
ln
[
pj,22 (z22)
p0,22 (z22)
]
= ρ (yj,22 − y0,22) + uhj,22 + ubj,22 + ulj,22
+
22+17∑
τ=23
(
1
1 + i
)τ−22
ln
[
p0τ (z
(0)
τ )
p0τ (z
(j)
τ )
]
−
22+17∑
τ=23
(
1
1 + i
)τ−22
ρ
[
R˜(s22, q22)−R (z22)
]
(20)
From equation (20) one can notice that the planning horizon cannot exceed
17 years. If a female gives birth to a child, she expects to care for this child
until the child turns 18, when, according to our assumption, the child leaves
the parent family and forms her own household. Once the youngest child
reaches age of 18 and leaves a household, no more children are born to the
household as the probability of such cases is very small. The planning horizons
for three decisions, which we consider in this paper, do not have to coincide.
For decision to work, we can rely on finite dependence (shown in Altug and
Miller 1998, and further formalized in Arcidiacono and Miller 2011), which
occurs in two periods in our model specification.
Having the conditional choice probabilities computed for each combination
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Table 5: Wage equation
ln(wageit) = B1Xit +B2(OitXit) + µt + ηi + it,
where Oit is a dummy for homeowner
Xt B1 B2
(1) (2)
∆Hours worked at t− 1 0.113
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)
∆Work at t− 1 −0.049
(0.009)
0.014
(0.011)
∆(Age×Education) 0.639
(0.119)
0.048
(0.059)
∆Age2 −0.241
(0.044)
−0.031
(0.022)
∆Marital*Hours worked at t− 1 0.039
(0.007)
of the state vector, we have simulated outcomes ready. To account for potential
pre-existing conditions, the initial distribution by the education, race, marital
status, homeownership status, labor-force participation indicator, children and
the age of the youngest child, as well as home size and hours of work supplied
by the household at ages 20 - 22 are drawn from the joint empirical distribution
in the PSID data.
C Estimation of wage equation
The summary statistics in Table 1 show homeowners and renters differ in their
labor force participation, average hours worked, and labor income. Our first set
of estimates shed light on why those differences emerge. The estimated wage
equation is for the most part standard, including basic demographic charac-
teristics, including age, education, and marital status, along with lagged labor
force participation and working hours (see Miller and Sanders 1997; Altug and
Miller 1998; Gayle and Miller 2006, for a similar wage equation specification).
In view of the last two rows of Table 1, that imply homeowners earn a higher
wage rate than tenants, we control for home ownership to investigate the direct
effects of ownership status on the wage rate.
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients on demographic
and labor input variables interacted with the homeownership dummy. All
the coefficients on variables related to labor supply history interacted with the
homeownership dummy are insignificant. Therefore we do not reject the main-
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Figure 7: Transition from homeownership to renting.
tained null hypothesis that home ownership does not directly affect the wage
rate.If the model is to explain differences in the wage rate between homeowners
and renters, they must arise from differences either in their labor supply be-
havior that feed into the determination of the wage rate, or in the background
variables of age, education and marital status.
The results from Table 5 provide mechanisms that might reconcile these
differences. Since education interacted with age has a positive effect on wages,
part of the positive correlation between home ownership and the wage rate is
due to the fact that homeowners are more educated than tenants (shown in the
second row in Table 1). Similarly we find marriage magnifies the effect of past
hours worked on the current wage rate, a result that resonates with similar
conclusions reached by Killewald and Gough (2013) and Eckstein, Keane, and
Lifshitz (2019), and homeowners are more likely to be married (see the third
row of Table 1.) Apparently these two factors dominate the negative effect on
wages of homeowners working fewer hours than tenants.
D Additional evidence from the data
Figure 7 shows that homeowners rarely revert to renting permanent accom-
modation and the rate of reverting to renting is fairly stable over the period
between 1970s and 1990s.
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